Post-Reform Medicaid before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes by Huberfeld, Nicole
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications
2012
Post-Reform Medicaid before the Court:
Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting
Attitudes
Nicole Huberfeld
University of Kentucky College of Law, nicole.huberfeld@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 Annals Health L. 513
(2012).
Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court:
Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes
Nicole Huberfeld*
The United States Supreme Court heard two Medicaid cases this term
that raise major questions about the program and the tensions it creates be-
tween the federal and state governments. On October 3, 2011, the Court
heard oral arguments in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern
California, a dispute between California and its Medicaid providers regard-
ing reimbursement cuts resulting from California's budget crisis.' The
Medicaid providers argued that the proposed cuts are so extreme as to vio-
late federal law and thus the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. Their contention hinged on the Equal Access Provision of the Medi-
caid Act, which commands states to pay healthcare providers that
participate in Medicaid "sufficient[ly]" to ensure that Medicaid enrollees
have the same access to medical care as other citizens in their geographic
area.2 This provision is at the heart of Medicaid's aspirational design,
which is meant to mainstream impoverished patients into the American
healthcare system. Enforcement of this provision will be crucial for the
success of the Medicaid expansion scheduled to begin in 2014. But, the
United States' position in Douglas was decidedly deferential to states' deci-
sions regarding Medicaid and went so far as to argue that only the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) could enforce the terms of the
Medicaid Act, a view that is contested by many.
On the other hand, the United States expressed a broad view of federal
power when it expanded Medicaid to everyone up to 133% of the federal
poverty level in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).3
* Professor of Law at University of Kentucky College of Law. This paper grew out of her
comments at the 5th Annual Symposium for Access to Healthcare on November 4, 2011 at
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Many thanks go to the participants in that sym-
posium as well as the participants in the Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Consti-
tutional Law Colloquium. Thanks always, DT.
1. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. _ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 1204
(No. 09-958) (2012).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2011), amended by 125 Stat. 1280 (2011).
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2001(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.§
1396(a)).
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This is a major philosophical shift for Medicaid that partially federalizes a
program historically deemed an exercise in cooperative federalism. 4 The
Court heard oral arguments March 26 through 28, 2012, in Florida v. De-
partment of Health and Human Services,5 and though much of the media
and scholarly conversation has focused on the constitutionality of the min-
imum services provision, 6 the first question in the states' petition was
whether the Medicaid expansion constitutes impermissible coercion under
the South Dakota v. Dole test for constitutional conditions on federal spend-
ing.7 Thus, the greatest change to the Medicaid program since its inception
could be nullified by the Supreme Court as a matter of Spending Clause in-
terpretation, even though the federal government has exercised power to in-
fluence the states within the known bounds of the Court's spending juris-
prudence.8
This essay focuses on the conflicting arguments made by the United
States in its briefs in Douglas and in Florida v. HHS. Douglas had the po-
tential to close the courthouse doors to both Medicaid enrollees and provid-
ers because of the United States' deferential stance toward the states, a posi-
tion consistent with longstanding states' rights concerns in the Medicaid
program. Even though the Court decided Douglas quite narrowly, litigation
continues in California's federal courts and could return to the high court
relatively quickly. 9 In contrast, the federal government has advocated a
very broad view of federal authority under the spending power to modify
and expand Medicaid despite some states' lack of support for the federal-
ized elements of Medicaid. This position is consistent with the reinvention
of Medicaid effectuated by PPACA and the statutory structure of Medicaid
4. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431 (2011).
5. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11 th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-400).
6. PPACA § 1501 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). For a nice bibliography of the
major writing on the topic, see Bradley Joondeph, Some Essential Reading, ACA LITIGATION
BLOG (June 3, 2011), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/some-essential-reading.
html.
7. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
8. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (citing the holding in
South Dakota v. Dole that conditional spending is a permissible method for influencing state
legislation).
9. See Cal. Med. Transp. Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV 11-9830 CAS, 2012 WL 760696, at
*5 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) (granting the CMTA's request for a preliminary injunction
against the rate reductions approved by CMS); Cal. Hosp. Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV 11-
9078 CAS, 2012 WL 760646, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) (granting a similar preliminary
injunction); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Douglas, CV 11-9688 CAS, 2012 WL 273768, at *16 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction against Director Douglas and Secre-
tary Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human Services); Managed Pharmacy Care v.
Sebelius, No. CV 11-9211 CAS, 2011 WL 6820288, at *11 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 28, 2011) (grant-
ing a preliminary injunction against Secretary Sebelius).
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itself since 1965.
This paper will evaluate the dichotomous positions the United States has
advanced before the Court. First this paper will discuss the complexities of
Douglas and the United States' surprising advocacy in that case. The essay
will next address the grant of certiorari regarding PPACA's Medicaid ex-
pansion from the perspective of the United States' power-protective pos-
ture. Finally, this essay will evaluate the tensions between the United
States' positions and will conclude that the Court's best course of action is
to decide each case as narrowly as possible so as to allow Congress and
HHS latitude to resolve their conflicting attitudes toward Medicaid and
conditional spending.'
0
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF DOUGLAS
The Court heard oral arguments in Douglas on the first day of the Octo-
ber 2011 term, a case that already was significant for exploring a relatively
untested theory of enforcement for the Medicaid Act but that gained greater
importance given the grant of certiorari regarding the Medicaid expansion.
On the surface, this litigation was a dispute between the state of California
and its Medicaid providers concerning reimbursement cuts due to Califor-
nia's budget crisis. The Medicaid providers argued that these proposed cuts
were so extreme as to violate federal law. Their contention hinged on the
Equal Access Provision of the Medicaid Act, often referred to as "30A,"
which commands states to pay healthcare providers that participate in Med-
icaid "sufficient[ly]" in an attempt to ensure that Medicaid enrollees have
the same access to medical care as other citizens in their geographic area."
This provision is at the heart of Medicaid's goal of mainstreaming impover-
ished patients into the American healthcare system, 12 and enforcement of
this provision will be crucial for the success of the Medicaid expansion in
2014."3
Douglas was comprised of three cases consolidated by the Court, which
originated in the Ninth Circuit. The controversy produced multiple deci-
sions at the district and circuit court levels, and it will continue to do so
even after the Court's decision.' 4 In response to its economic crisis, Cali-
10. Early drafts of this essay prescribed that the Court decide Douglas as narrowly as
possible. The Court decided Douglas in this manner late in the editing process.
11. 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2011).
12. See generally ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN
AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID (1974).
13. See infra Part II.
14. The history is quite complex. Docket Nos. 09-1158, 09-958, and 10-283 and subse-
quent case histories were consolidated into the Douglas decision. Docket No. 09-1158, the
primary decision was Cal. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1115 (9th
2012]
Annals of Health Law
fomia passed a law reducing Medicaid reimbursement to a range of one to
ten percent (depending on the type of healthcare provider) without perform-
ing an analysis regarding the access implications.' 5 Every state that partici-
pates in Medicaid must submit a State Plan to the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) for approval, as well as any
amendments to that plan, which must also be approved or CMS can refuse
to continue to pay that state.16 The reimbursement reductions instituted by
California occurred simultaneously with the submission of the State Plan
Amendment application, which meant that the state reduced rates for as
long as the Secretary took to review the amendment for compliance with the
Medicaid Act. The Secretary denied the initial submission of State Plan
amendments for failure to demonstrate compliance with 30A, which Cali-
fornia appealed through proper administrative processes.
A group of California Medicaid (Medi-Cal) stakeholders, including doc-
tors, pharmacists, and senior-citizen advocacy groups, as well as Medicaid
enrollees, sought to enjoin California from instituting this legislation. 7
They claimed that, under the methodology the Ninth Circuit had developed,
California did not follow the proscribed procedure of relying on "responsi-
ble cost studies, its own or others', that provide reliable data as a basis for
its rate setting."' 8 The plaintiffs did not claim that they suffered individual
harm; rather, they claimed that the state disobeyed the federal statute, which
violated the Supremacy Clause and entitled the plaintiffs to a preliminary
injunction to prevent the harm that would derive from failure to comply
Cir. 2010), cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 992 (2011); and in No. 10-283, the primary deci-
sion was Santa Rosa Hosp. v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 09-17633 (9th Cir. May 12, 2010), cert.
granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 996 (2011). Just to illustrate, the following decisions also pertain:
Cal. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 09-55365 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2010); Cal. Phar-
macists Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 09-722 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2010); Cal. Pharmacists
Ass'n v. Jolly, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Managed Pharmacy Care v.
Maxwell Jolly, No. 09-382 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2009). In No. 09-958, the primary decision
was Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 663 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted in part, No. 09-958 (argued Oct. 3,2011).
15. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14105.19 (West 2012), also referred to as "California
Assembly Bill X35" or "AB 5."
16. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a), 1396a(b) (2011).
17. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir.
2009).
18. The Ninth Circuit created a rubric for states to follow to avoid running afoul of 30A
when proposing cuts to Medicaid funding. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491,
1496 (9 h Cir. 1997) (requiring the state to consider "efficient and economical hospitals'
costs of providing quality services, unless the Department shows some justification for rates
that substantially deviate from such costs."). Even if the state had performed such studies, it
seems the plaintiffs could claim that California violated the terms of 30A because historic
studies had proven that such reductions in reimbursement lead to Medicaid provider exodus.
[Vol. 21
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with 30A.' 9
Even though the state failed to perform the required cost studies, the dis-
trict court denied the request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the
Equal Access provision did not create enforceable rights.20 In Independent
Living Center v. Shewry, the Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal and held
that the Supremacy Clause claim was a valid cause of action that the parties
could assert against the state.2' Subsequently, in Independent Living Center
v. Maxwell-Jolly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the state did not comply
with the court's prior description of sufficiency for 30A. 22 Additionally, the
court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not seek to enforce rights by an end-
run around the defunct Section 1983 scheme but rather to enforce federal
law against the state. 23 As a matter of preemption, the state enacted legisla-
tion that appeared contrary to the goals of the federal statute.24 Further, as a
procedural matter under Ex parte Young, the plaintiffs appropriately filed
the action against the responsible state officer for prospective injunctive re-
lief. The state then waived its sovereign immunity by appearing in the ini-
tial state court action and then removing to federal court, thereby waiving
sovereign immunity arguments.
25
The Supremacy Clause cause of action, though longstanding, has not
been plaintiffs' first choice in Medicaid filings. For many years, the civil
rights law known as Section 1983, which created a private right of action
against states for violations of rights protected by the federal constitution
and laws, was the common path to the courthouse.2 6 In 2002, the Court nar-
rowed private rights of action under Section 1983 in Gonzaga University v.
Doe, and, subsequently, lower federal courts have found that 30A is no
longer enforceable by private parties through Section 1983.27 Congress did
not amend the Medicaid Act in response to this shift in Section 1983 juris-
prudence, and it did not increase CMS's power to enforce the Medicaid Act
19. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 2008 WL 4298223, *2, *4 (C.D.Cal. 2008).
20. Id. at *4-5.
21. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008).
22. Indep. Living Ctr. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 651-52 (9th Cir. 2009).
23. Id. at 652-53.
24. Id at 652.
25. Id. at 660-62 (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 623-24 (2002)). This
series of events occurred through a different district court decision and a different circuit
court decision, but a summary of their reasoning is provided in the last Ninth Circuit deci-
sion, which is the basis of the grant before the Court.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
27. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre
Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 413 (2008) (explaining how Gonzaga closed the courthouse doors to Medi-
caid litigation).
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against states. 28 Still in need of a way to enjoin states that fail to fulfill the
terms of the Medicaid bargain, Medicaid providers and enrollees have
turned to the Supremacy Clause, asserting that a state that fails to comply
with the terms of the Medicaid Act violates the Supremacy Clause and,
therefore, must be prevented from violating the federal law.29 Thus, such
plaintiffs tend to seek injunctive relief but not damages because the cause of
action is not personal.
The Court's grant of certiorari for one preliminary issue only was de-
signed to answer whether this strategy is successful: "Whether Medicaid re-
cipients and providers may maintain a cause of action under the Supremacy
Clause to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) by asserting that the provision
preempts a state law reducing reimbursement rates? [sic] '30 Because the
Court granted the petition on such a broad constitutional question, Douglas
had the potential to revise longstanding interpretation of the Spending and
Supremacy Clauses and to shape wide swaths of healthcare policy and
spending jurisprudence. This last statement would seem alarmist but for the
substantive amicus brief filed by the Acting Solicitor General for the
Obama Administration.3'
The United States' merits brief asserted that no private right of action is
available for Medicaid providers or enrollees to enforce 30A against the
states.32 Though acknowledging that private parties historically have had
the ability to enforce federal statutes through implied rights of action under
the Supremacy Clause, the United States argued that the "parallel" between
spending programs and contracts dictates that, like third-party beneficiaries,
those who merely benefit from the federal spending (anyone who is not the
state or the federal government) do not have an implied right of action. The
brief further stated that a non-statutory cause of action would be "incon-
sistent with the nature of the federal-state relationship in this setting. ' 33 In
other words, if Congress does not explicitly provide a cause of action in the
spending-based statute, only the federal government can enforce its terms.
The United States' merits brief was deferential to states and to the pro-
cess by which states implement reimbursement rate reductions. Even
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. CMS has the power to stop Medicaid payments to a state,
but that is about all it can do.
29. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509-13 (8th Cir. 2006) (accepting the
theory of preemption by the Medicaid Act, but remanding for further development of the
record in the case).
30. Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 992 (2011).
31. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas v. In-
dep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283 (U.S. filed May 26, 2011),
2011 WL 2132705 [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Douglas].
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 10.
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though the brief acknowledged how important it is for states to abide by
30A, it then pointed to the draft regulations for 30A as the source for self-
enforcement. 34 The draft regulations, discussed infra, provide some guid-
ance for states to self-evaluate reimbursement sufficiency; however, they
provide no mechanism for CMS to enforce reimbursement sufficiency
against states beyond the traditional fund removal remedy. 35 The brief also
described compliance with 30A as a matter for state interpretation in the
first instance that is inappropriate for judicial review.36 The government
presented state budget cuts through reimbursement reductions as part of the
state's "implementation" of Medicaid in the context of the State's undertak-
ing with the federal government. 37 The brief then expressed skepticism
about the substance of the plaintiffs' claim that providers would not be able
to afford to participate in Medicaid due to the Medi-Cal rate reductions. 38
The United States asserted that the real question is whether Medicaid
providers and enrollees can seek injunctions, which the United States
claimed they cannot do for several reasons. First, no Section 1983 cause of
action exists.39 This was not a radical observation, as all parties agreed that
Section 1983 was not an open avenue for the plaintiffs.40 The irony of this
position, though, is that Section 1983 was used regularly to enforce 30A un-
til the Court strictly narrowed the scope of Section 1983 actions in Gonzaga
University v. Doe.41 That seems to render the argument disingenuous, as
Gonzaga was not about Medicaid interpretation or enforceability, but was a
limitation on Section 1983 causes of action generally. Second, the United
States' brief stated that the Court need not revisit all causes of action arising
under the Supremacy Clause, and so the United States was not asking for
too much.42 Yet, the United States asserted that its "limitation" was coop-
erative federalism programs under the Social Security Act, which should be
excluded from Supremacy Clause actions because Spending Clause pro-
34. See Brief for the United States in Douglas, supra note 31, at 31.
35. See Brief of Former HHS Officials As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
23-24, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283 (U.S.
filed Aug. 5, 2011), 2011 WL 3706105 [hereinafter Brief of Former HHS Officials] (report-
ing CMS's "disinclination" to take action against states because withholding funds will hurt
Medicaid enrollees).
36. See id. at 15-16.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. (The brief further notes that the majority of appellate circuits agree that Section
1983 cannot be used to enforce private rights under 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A)).
41. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 290 (2002). The Court in Gonzaga in-
sisted that only an "unambiguously conferred right" could be enforced through Section 1983,
thereby severely narrowing the scope of 1983 actions.
42. Brief for the United States in Douglas, supra note 31, at 21.
2012]
Annals of Health Law
grams are different from other preemption analyses. 43 Third, the Solicitor
General reiterated the contract analogy from Pennhurst,44 Arlington,45 and
other conditional spending cases and concluded that beneficiaries of spend-
ing programs do not have enforceable rights.46
The merits brief indicated in a number of ways that the federal govern-
ment and the states are equal partners in Medicaid, even though it is a fed-
eral program funded primarily with federal money that states receive only
when they agree to a federal superstructure.47 The United States' brief was
surprising for at least four reasons. First, when the Court solicited the view
of the Solicitor General, the office recommended that the Court deny the
petition for certiorari. 48 The Acting Solicitor General reasoned that HHS
was in the process of drafting regulations that would address the ambigui-
ties in the 30A sufficiency language that led to a circuit split regarding the
meaning of this statute; the State Plan amendments submitted by California
regarding the payment reductions had been denied by CMS; and no other
circuit had decided whether Supremacy Clause causes of action were via-
ble, leaving the Court with no dispute between circuits to settle on that
question. 49 Even though the Solicitor General's office is often described as
the most influential litigant before the Court, frequently referred to as the
"Tenth Justice," the Court granted the petition for certiorari on the Suprem-
acy Clause question.5°
Second, the Solicitor General's merits brief supported California's con-
tention that the state should be free from private litigation, but for much
broader reasons than California asserted. California claimed that the Medi-
caid Act itself does not confer a cause of action on providers or enrollees.
Further, California articulated that states do not have clear notice of private
causes of action under the Medicaid Act as required by the South Dakota v.
Dole conditional spending test, a point of focus and reiteration during oral
argument.5' The United States' brief, which was not joined by HHS, ar-
43. Id. at 17.
44. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
45. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).
46. Id. at 28.
47. To wit, see the lengthy requirements for submitting a successful State Plan at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West 2011).
48. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living
Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., No. 09-958 (U.S. filed Dec. 3, 2010), 2010 WL 4959708 [hereinafter
Brief for the United States in Maxwell-Jolly].
49. Id. at 10-21.
50. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices
in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 572 (1988) (crediting a New Yorker article with the
phrase).
51. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 10, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal.
[Vol. 21
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gued that spending statutes cannot create a private right of action unless
Congress has clearly stated that private parties may abrogate state sovereign
immunity in cooperative federalism programs. Instead, the Acting Solicitor
General opined that the only remedy available is for CMS to review the
state's amendments to its State Plan and either reject or accept them.52
This was the alarming aspect of the United States' brief. Though the
Acting Solicitor General acknowledged that, for example, Justice Kennedy
rejected this view in his dissent in Golden State Transit,53 the brief relied on
opinions by statutory strict constructionist justices who have articulated the
view that cooperative federalism programs should never be judicially en-
forceable. 54 Thus, the brief not only sided with California, it essentially
adopted the conservative position advanced in concurrences by Justices
Scalia and Thomas in PhRM4 v. Walsh and by Justice Scalia in Blessing v.
Freestone. Their viewpoint, largely ignored by courts, is that no private
right of action can exist for beneficiaries of spending programs to enforce
federal standards against states without a clear statement in the language of
the statute that such a right of action exists.55 In other words, implied rights
56of action do not exist for beneficiaries of spending programs.
This position is reminiscent of the renegade district court opinion in
Westside Mothers v. Haveman, wherein Judge Cleland held that enrollees
could not challenge state failure to comply with mandatory elements of
Medicaid because spending programs are mere contracts that cannot be en-
forced by third party beneficiaries (an analysis rejected by the Sixth Circuit
on appeal).57 Though the Court has analogized conditional spending to a
contract between the federal government and the state receiving the spend-
ing, the contract idea has always been just that, an analogy, not the rule of
law for interpreting the spending power. Though the Court has considered
the contract analogy for some time, it has never gone so far as to treat laws
generated under the power to spend as different from (or less than) other
(Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument_
transcripts/09-958.pdf; see also Brief for Petitioners, at 20-21, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. Cal., Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283 (U.S. filed May 19, 2011), 2011 WL 2062344.
52. Brief for the United States in Maxwell-Jolly, supra note 48, at 18-19.
53. Id. at 15 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 119
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
54. Id. (citing Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring)). The brief quotes Justice Thomas stating that there are "serious
questions as to whether third parties may sue to enforce Spending Clause legislation -
through preemption or otherwise."
55. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. at 674-83 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring
and Thomas, J. concurring).
56. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349-50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587-9 (E.D. Mich. 2001),
rev'd, 289 F.3d 852 (2002).
2012]
Annals of Health Law
Article I enumerated powers. 58 The Solicitor General's brief thus took a
much stronger, and broader, position on private parties' ability to enforce
the Medicaid Act against states than anyone would have predicted.
Third, the Solicitor General's merits brief supported the current perverse
incentives of the Equal Access provision and laid too much in the lap of
CMS and the Secretary of HHS. If states pay Medicaid providers less than
"sufficient[ly]," the federal government saves money by states paying out
fewer Medicaid dollars that the federal government must match.59 Thus,
CMS has little motivation to enforce the Equal Access provision or to shift
its attention away from fraud prosecution, which has long been the focus of
the agency's limited resources. 60  Though CMS can withdraw Medicaid
funding from noncompliant states, that penalty would harm the very popu-
lations intended to be helped. Additionally, total funding withdrawal has
never happened, seemingly because CMS recognizes the draconian and
counterproductive nature of penalizing states in this way. The problem for
CMS is not only perverse incentives, but also lack of resources and appro-
priate authority.
Counsel for HHS did not participate in the Solicitor General's brief, a
departure from the amicus brief filed at the petition stage that appears to re-
flect deep disagreement between the Solicitor General's Office and HHS
regarding the position taken by the United States. 61 Though HHS itself did
not file an amicus brief, former HHS officials filed their own brief refuting
the points made by the Solicitor General's office. 62 That separate amicus
58. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). For a description and analysis of the contours of
the contract analogy, see Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Un-
clear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REv. 441, 448,
456, 470 (2008).
59. Though the Secretary of HHS is given the power to grant or deny applications for
amending State Plans, in reality CMS is responsible for every day administration and en-
forcement of the Medicaid Act. The Brief of Former HHS Administrators discusses the en-
forcement problems as being problems for HHS generally and CMS specifically, as CMS is
a sub-agency of HHS. Thus, this essay discusses both HHS and CMS in describing the en-
forcement problem.
60. See Huberfeld, supra note 27, at 465; see also Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme
Court's Assault On Litigation: Why (And How) It Might Be Good For Health Law, 90 B.U.
L. REv. 2323, 2341 (2010); LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 154-78 (2010).
61. See Robert Pear, Administration Opposes Challenges to Medicaid Cuts, N.Y. TIMES
(May 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/us/29medicaid.html (describing the
surprise regarding the Obama administration's position in the case); Robert Pear, Democrats
Challenging Administration on Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011) (describing the break
between the Obama administration and members of Congress, administrators of HHS, and
others).
62. Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 35; see also Pear, supra note 61 (de-
scribing the Solicitor General's position and the reactions of "dismay" to the conservative
view advanced by the Obama Administration).
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brief asserted that CMS has relied on private rights of action to ensure that
states comply with their Medicaid obligations. 63 The former officials attest-
ed that CMS is under-funded and under-staffed and could never police the
states in the way that the Solicitor General's office posited. The former of-
ficials further stated that CMS has come to rely on private causes of action
to help flag states that have reduced payment rates inappropriately, either
with or without amendments to the State Plan. The states refuted this posi-
tion (more than half of the states weighed in for the petitioners).64 Further,
they seemed to be denying that Medicaid is a federal program that states
must administer appropriately if they accept federal funds, which is clearly
61incorrect from both a statutory and a federalism perspective. In short,
CMS does not have the resources to administratively rein in the states as the
United States envisions, but the states do need the kind of oversight that
private causes of action provide.
Further, administrative enforcement failings are not ameliorated by the
draft regulations designed to help CMS implement the Equal Access provi-
sion.66 The draft regulations define "sufficien[cy]" for purposes of the
Equal Access mandate and provide states with methods to measure suffi-
ciency and to report their findings to CMS. 6 7 States are also required to per-
form an "access review" anytime rate reductions are submitted as part of a
State Plan Amendment, the results of which must be "made available to the
public.., and to CMS upon request." 68 But, CMS has no apparent remedy
if sufficiency is not achieved, apart from rejecting the proposed amendment
to the State Plan. The trouble is that CMS has been granted the same lim-
ited yet formidable remedy as the enabling statute contains. 69 And, states
are responsible for monitoring their own reimbursement sufficiency, self-
reporting deficiencies, and creating action plans for correcting access prob-
lems. 70 Further, major elements of Medicaid's current care delivery, such
as managed care reimbursement, are not included in the review standards,
as managed care is addressed in a separate Part of the Code of Federal Reg-
63. Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 35, at 18-21.
64. Brief of Amici Curiae Michigan and 30 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283 (U.S.
filed May 26, 2011), 2011 WL 4454477.
65. States cannot participate in Medicaid unless they submit a State Plan that is ap-
proved by the Secretary of HHS and that complies with the terms of the Medicaid Act. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(10) (2010), amended by 126 Stat. 156 (2012).
66. Methods for Assuring Access to Medicaid Coverage, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (May 6,
2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
67. Id. at 26345, 26361.
68. Id. at 26361.
69. See id.
70. Id.
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ulations.71 This is a gaping hole in the enforcement scheme, as the vast ma-
jority (approximately seventy percent) of Medicaid enrollees are in Medi-
caid programs administered by private managed care organizations.72 Thus,
for a variety of reasons, the United States' position is at odds with the reali-
ty of Medicaid administration.
Fourth, the United States' amicus brief asserted that Congress intended
to foreclose private rights of action to enforce the Equal Access provision
against the states, but this position directly contradicted the Brief of Mem-
bers of Congress.73 The Solicitor General asserted that Congress decided
not to include a private cause of action to enforce the Medicaid Act against
states. Therefore, to allow a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause
would contradict congressional intent.74 But the members of the House and
Senate stressed that Congress has relied on private actions to enforce the
Medicaid Act and that Congress deliberately has not amended 30A to pre-
vent private rights of action, even though such an amendment was consid-
ered.75 Further, the members of Congress recognized that a spending pro-
gram enforced by federal agencies benefits from private enforcement,
which "provides a middle ground between doing nothing and cutting off
funding."
76
Lack of compliance with the Equal Access provision will become a more
pressing problem in 2014, when the universal insurance coverage provi-
sions of PPACA become effective in part through the Medicaid expansion
(discussed further below). CMS does not have the resources to police each
state. Further, according to the Congressional Budget Office, the Medicaid
population is estimated to expand by about sixteen million adults.77 Though
entry into Medicaid will be simplified by the new single application system
effectuated by PPACA, entry is not the problem. More enrollees require
more providers and more reimbursement (albeit at much lower state contri-
71. Id. at 26344.
72. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and Access to Health Care - A Proposal for Continued
Inaction?, 365 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 102, 103 (July 14, 2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMpl 106046 (describing one of the inadequacies
of the draft regulations as including this loophole for managed care organizations).
73. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 21-24,
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., Nos. 09-958, 09-1158, 10-283 (U.S. filed Aug.
4, 201 1), 2011 WL 3467244 [hereinafter Brief of Members of Congress].
74. Brief for the United States in Douglas, supra note 31, at 26.
75. Brief of Members of Congress, supra note 73, at 8-11.
76. Id. at 14 (citing to the Brief for the United States in Maxwell-Jolly, supra note 48, at
19).
77. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SELECTED CBO PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO
HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION, 2009-2010 11 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
120xx/doc 12033/12-23-SelectedHealthcare Publications.pdf.
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bution percentages).78 Once the total federal funding disappears, if states
underfund the Medicaid expansion, it could be ineffectual, as the population
of providers willing to accept Medicaid patients is already small due to low
reimbursement rates. That small population will be overwhelmed by the
burden of the new enrollees, and provider attrition due to overwork and un-
derpayment may become a real possibility. Though PPACA requires reim-
bursement of primary care physicians at Medicare rates, this boon to Medi-
caid providers will only last for two years under PPACA as enacted.79
A notable postscript occurred when CMS approved some of the rate re-
ductions proposed by California, the same reductions that are at issue in
Douglas.80 As soon as the rate reductions were approved, more claims for
injunctive relief were filed by the California Hospital Association, the Cali-
fornia Medical Association, and other Medi-Cal providers. 8' The claims
appear to echo the payment issues in Douglas. In addition, on November
29, 2011, a similar case was filed in Arizona whereby hospitals sought to
enjoin a rate reduction of five percent that has since been approved by
CMS. 82 That complaint was also based on 30A violations and invoked both
the Supremacy Clause and Section 1983.83
The Court asked the parties for additional briefing regarding the impact
of the CMS approval on Douglas.84 The United States responded that the
case was not moot, despite the amendment approval, because the Ninth Cir-
cuit's injunctions were not dependent upon the presence or absence of CMS
approval of the reductions. Additionally, the Court's grant of certiorari was
based upon the cause of action question, not a determination as to the actual
78. The Medicaid expansion provides for complete federal funding at the outset of the
expansion, which phases down to ninety cents on the Medicaid dollar by 2020, a match that
is still more generous than traditional Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y), amended by 126
Stat. 156 (2012).
79. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1202, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). An extension of this payment requirement would be a smart
step toward ensuring care for the expansion population.
80. Press Release, Norman Williams, Cal. Dep't of Healthcare Servs., Department Of
Health Care Services Announces Federal Approval Of Medi-Cal Budget Reductions (Oct.
27, 2011), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/publications/opa/Documents/11-06%20S
PA%20Approvals.pdf.
81. David Gorn, California Hospitals Ask Courts to Halt Cuts, CALIFORNIA
HEALTHLINE (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.califomiahealthline.org/capitol-desk/2011/ll/
court-to-consider-rate-cut-injunction.aspx.
82. Arizona Hosp. and Healthcare Ass'n v. Betlach, CV1 1-2348-PHX-DGC (D. Az.
filed Nov. 29, 2011).
83. Complaint at 16-18, 22, Arizona Hosp. and Healthcare Ass'n v. Betlach, CV I1-
2348-PHX-DGC (D. Az. Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/
2011/11/30/Phoenix.pdf.
84. Lyle Denniston, New Briefs Due in Medicaid Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 4, 2011,
2:47 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 11/I I/new-briefs-due-in-medicaid-cases/.
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sufficiency of the state's reductions.
Despite the Solicitor General's request that the Court decide the Suprem-
acy Clause question, the decision in Douglas was quite narrow (and issued
earlier than many anticipated).86 The five-justice majority opinion, penned
by Justice Breyer, vacated and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.
8 7
The Court displayed concern for the functioning of the Medicaid program
and a sense that the Supremacy Clause question might be avoided due to
agency review and judicial deference. 88 The pithy opinion began with an
explanation of the Medicaid program and review of the manner in which
CMS reviews State Plans and proposed amendments. The Court noted that
the case had not become moot but that the posture of the case was quite dif-
ferent from when certiorari was granted.8 9 Justice Breyer then explained
that CMS's approval of some California rate cuts indicated that administra-
tive law principles might govern the outcome of the case, and at a mini-
mum, would impact the assessment of the Supremacy Clause right of ac-
tion.90
The majority also closely echoed the concerns articulated by the justices
during oral arguments; namely, Justice Breyer questioned the parties about
primary jurisdiction, which indicated he sought a narrow holding; and, Jus-
tice Kennedy specifically noted the position of the ex-administrators of
HHS that the agency relies on private rights of action.9' This concern may
have kept Justice Kennedy from joining the dissent's powerful rejection of
Supremacy Clause rights of action for spending legislation.
92
In contrast to the program-centric majority opinion, the dissent's opinion,
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, focused on federalism, constitutional
questions, 93 and legislative clear statement rules. 94 Whereas the majority
85. United States' Supplemental Brief Letter, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal.,
Inc., No. 09-958 (submitted Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/supreme-courtpreview/briefs/09-958_usasuppletter.
authcheckdam.pdf.
86. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207-08 (2012) (not-
ing that circumstances have changed, which led the majority to vacate and remand for pro-
ceedings consistent with CMS's approval of California rate changes).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1210.
90. Id.
91. Oral Argument at 34:34, 4:45, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132
S.Ct. 1204 (No. 09-958), available at http://oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011 09 958.
92. Douglas, 132 S.Ct. at 1213.
93. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("Here the law established by Congress is that there is
no remedy available to private parties to enforce the federal rules against the State. For equi-
table powers would raise the most serious concerns regarding both the separation of powers
(Congress, not the Judiciary, decides whether there is a private right of action to enforce a
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wrote about the nature and requirements of the Medicaid program, the dis-
sent quickly moved to describe the Medicaid Act as "Spending Clause leg-
islation" that does not provide anyone with a private cause of action to en-
force 30A.9 5 The dissent rejected the assertions of the Members of
Congress amicus brief and the Ex-Administrators brief that Congress and
HHS intend for Medicaid's requirements to be enforced privately. Instead,
Chief Justice Roberts would have held that Congress did not intend to sup-
ply a right of action because the language of the statute contains no such
right, and, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot maintain the "end-run" cause of
action under the Supremacy Clause.
96
Even though a majority of the Court rejected it, the government's posi-
tion contained the dangerous assumption that the states could self-police
one of the most important aspects of the Medicaid program, even though it
would be against their self-interest. The United States also asserted that
CMS could put an end to any inappropriate reimbursement cuts, even
though it rarely does SO.97 These views seem to be at odds with the unre-
strained federal power the United States has advocated in Florida v. HHS.
II. MEDICAID EXPANSION BEFORE THE COURT
An increasingly large number of Americans rely on Medicaid for access
to healthcare, a high of sixty-nine million in 2010.98 This number will grow
significantly due to PPACA (sixteen million new enrollees according to the
Congressional Budget Office), which expands Medicaid eligibility to eve-
ryone up to 133% of the federal poverty level. 99 This expansion constitutes
an important philosophical change in Medicaid - one that federalizes the
definition of Medicaid eligibility by rejecting the idea that only the "deserv-
ing poor" qualify for Medicaid, a criterion long used by state welfare pro-
grams that dates to Elizabethan Poor Laws. 00 The Medicaid expansion re-
federal statute) and federalism (the States under the Spending Clause agree only to condi-
tions clearly specified by Congress, not any implied on an ad hoc basis by courts).").
94. See id
95. Id. at 1214 ("If, as I believe, there is no private right of action under the Supremacy
Clause to enforce §30(A), that is the end of the matter.").
96. Id. at 1213.
97. See Brietta Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting & Payment Suits: How the Obama
Administration Is Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, __ How. L.J. _ (forthcoming
2012).
98. Christian Torres, Harvard Study Highlights Wide Range Of Medicaid Expansion
Estimates, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 26, 2011, 4:59 PM), http://capsules.
kaiserhealthnews.org/index.php/20 I /I 0/harvard-study-highlights-wide-range-of-medicaid-
expansion-estimates/.
99. PPACA, Pub. L. 111-148, §2001, 124 Stat. 119 (2008).
100. Huberfeld, supra note 4, at 450 (tracing Medicaid's history to underline the import
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suits in a second element of federalization, the total federal funding of the
expansion population that reduces to 90% in 2020.0 These two steps to-
ward federalization of Medicaid comprise a philosophical renewal of this
long-standing federal spending program that received surprisingly little de-
bate or attention in the course of creating healthcare reform. PPACA also
facilitates increased enrollment, because the minimum coverage provision
will encourage those who have avoided the stigma of Medicaid (despite
their eligibility) to enroll in the program through a new single application
mechanism.
0 2
Led by Florida, twenty-four states, the attorney general of Michigan, and
the governor of Iowa challenged the constitutionality of PPACA by focus-
ing on two major aspects of the law: the minimum insurance coverage re-
quirement, and the Medicaid expansion.' °3 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari on these questions and a few related ones as well, which were
combined for six and a half hours of oral argument from March 26 - 28,
2012.104 The petitions resulted from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dept. of Health and Human Services, the only ma-
jor PPACA challenge to raise the issue of whether Medicaid's expansion is
constitutional.105
The states in Florida v. HHS claimed that the Medicaid expansion consti-
tutes impermissible coercion under South Dakota v. Dole's test for constitu-
tional conditional spending. The Dole test contains four elements: (1) the
spending must be for the general welfare; (2) the conditions placed on
spending must be clear and unambiguous; (3) the conditions must be ger-
mane to the purposes of the spending; and (4) the conditions must not be
of this philosophical shift and arguing for full federalization of Medicaid from a federalism
perspective).
101. Id. at 451.
102. PPACA, Pub. L. 111-148 (enacted March 23, 2010), § 2201 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396w-3 (2010)) (This section of PPACA requires states, as a matter of Medi-
caid participation, to create an internet-based enrollment process by which the poor can ap-
ply for Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and subsidies in the exchanges,
all in one application.).
103. See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., No. 11-400 (filed Jan. 10, 2012).
104. See Florida v. Dep't of Health and Human Sen's., No. 11-400 (Nov. 14, 2011);
Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398 (Nov. 14, 2011); Nat'l Fed'n of
Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393 (Nov. 14, 2011) (in which the Court heard arguments on sever-
ability and the standing issue raised by the Anti-Injunction Act).
105. See Elizabeth Stawicki, Minnesota Appeals Court Hears Case Challenging Health
Law, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
201 l/October/21/appeals-court-minnesota-legal-challenge-insurance-mandate.aspx (noting
that the PPACA litigation in the Eighth Circuit also raised questions regarding the constitu-
tionality of the Medicaid expansion, but the case was dismissed at the district court level and
the appeal has only advanced to oral arguments).
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unconstitutional themselves. 0 6 The Court articulated a fifth concept in dic-
ta, that theoretically federal spending could reach a point at which pressure
becomes compulsion that impermissibly coerces the state into accepting the
federal funds. 0 7 Though the Court did not specify the source of this con-
cern, it seems clear that it must be the Tenth Amendment. No lower federal
court has found coercion to be a persuasive reason to set aside a federal
spending statute, though some have attempted to analyze the idea of coer-
cion and have acknowledged its existence. Consequently, the states are
providing the Court with a platform to expand on this thorny issue: either
coercion is a meaningful fifth requirement for constitutional conditional
spending supported by a judicially enforced Tenth Amendment, or it is not
and the coercion theory should be put to rest.
The district court and the Eleventh Circuit both validated the coercion
theory but rejected its application for different reasons. Judge Vinson
seemed to eliminate the justiciability of coercion, a surprise given the con-
servative tenor of the opinion. 108 The Eleventh Circuit evaluated coercion
in its analysis but found that this Medicaid expansion is not coercive, pri-
marily because the states have ample notice before the effective date of
2014, and because the federal government initially completely funds (and
later very generously funds) the expansion.' °9
The United States has refuted the coercion theory by painting Congress's
Spending Clause power expansively throughout the litigation."0 The merits
brief assessed the federal government's power to spend as "broad" because
it encompasses Congress's constitutional responsibility to appropriate funds
from the federal treasury and as containing the ability to place conditions on
that spending to make federal policy (especially under the current jurispru-
106. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
107. Id. at 206.
108. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp.
2d 1256, 1269, 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (illustrating how Judge Vinson struck down the mini-
mum coverage provision then declared it non-severable from a large and complex statutory
scheme).
109. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1264-68 (11 th Cir. 2011). The opinion also reasoned that the Medicaid Act makes it
clear that the federal government retains the power to amend the terms of the Medicaid pro-
gram at will and that the Secretary of HHS has authority to withhold all funds but also to
withhold less than that. See id.
110. See Brief for Respondents (Medicaid) at 18, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., No. 11-400 (U.S. filed Feb. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Medicaid Brief for Re-
spondents]. The United States also claimed broad spending authority in its opposition to the
petition for certiorari. See generally, Consolidated Brief for Respondents, Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11 -393; Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No.
11-400 (U.S. filed Oct. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 4941020 [hereinafter Consolidated Brief for Re-
spondents].
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dential architecture)."' Solicitor General Verrilli's oral argument reiterated
the clear power Congress has to place conditions on Medicaid as a function
of making federal policy through spending." 
2
Consequently, the United States has asserted that it has "wide latitude" to
create conditions for Medicaid. 1 3 The Medicaid Act has always specified
who states must cover in the Medicaid program as well as which services
must be provided to Medicaid enrollees. 14 Thus, the United States has ar-
gued that expanding the mandatory Medicaid eligible population to every-
one up to 133% of the federal poverty level is completely consistent with
Medicaid's statutory scheme.' 15 The United States has also noted that if a
state submits a Plan to participate in Medicaid, and the Secretary of HHS
accepts the State Plan, then the state must abide by federal rules (but the
reward is fifty to eighty-three cents on the state's Medicaid dollar; the fed-
eral government does most of the funding). 116 Further, the Medicaid Act
gives the federal government reserved power to "alter, amend, or repeal any
provision" of the law." 7 All of this was clear when states agreed to partici-
pate in Medicaid.
The United States has described the four elements of the Dole test and
noted that the complaining states did not take issue with any of the four
enumerated requirements of that test.' 18 Instead, the states claim that they
receive so much money from the federal government that it would be too
hard to extricate themselves from the program, and, therefore, Congress has
gone too far in creating conditions on Medicaid spending." 9 The states
claim to be coerced into remaining in a spending program that contains
terms to which they no longer agree.
120
111. Medicaid Brief for Respondents, supra note 110, at 20; Brief of Amici Curiae
Health Law and Policy Scholars and Prescription Drug Choices in Support of Respondents
on the Constitutional Validity of the Medicaid Expansion at 16-23, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., No. 11-400 (U.S. filed Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Health Law
Professors' Amicus Brief].
112. Oral Argument, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. (No. 11-400),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011 11 400.
113. Medicaid Brief for Respondents, supra note 110, at 22.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id. at 20-21, 24.
116. Id. at 27. The federal government funds both the medical care provided to enrol-
lees as well as a large portion of states' administrative costs.
117. Id. at 4, 16, 39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1304).
118. Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 110, at 14.
119. Id. at 15.
120. See Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 20-24, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., No. 11-400 (U.S. filed Jan. 10, 2012) (claiming that the states are co-
erced because Medicaid offers so much funding and because the possibility of funding loss
for failure to comply with the expansion creates no choice for the states).
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However, according to the United States, no aspect of the Medicaid pro-
gram is more essential than who it covers.' 21 The United States briefs have
described this as a "basic feature" of the spending program that the federal
government must be able to control lest it lose the ability to "fix the terms
on which it shall disburse federal money to the States." 122 The federal gov-
ernment would then allow states to fix the terms upon which they receive
federal funds; this is essentially where Medicaid started in the early grants
to states for medical welfare under the Social Security Act of 1935.123
This robust enunciation of the congressional power to spend and to place
conditions on spending is not unexpected for at least four reasons. First, the
Medicaid expansion is a philosophical change in the basic, elemental struc-
ture of the program, the kind of change the federal government effectuates
to ensure all states meet national policy standards for the program. This is
much like the program's expansion to pregnant women and children in the
1980s or the expansion to the permanently disabled Social Security Income
(SSI) population in the 1970s. 12 4 This type of floor-raising extension has
occurred before, though in the past, the antiquated "deserving poor" catego-
ries were always preserved.
Second, this view is consistent with the Court's jurisprudence regarding
the Spending Clause, underdeveloped though it may be. Even though the
Court has used a contract analogy to parse spending questions, the Court
has always limited the analogy to that and nothing more. The Court must
limit the contract analogy, as the federal government and the states are not
equals in the conditional spending bargain - the Supremacy Clause tells us
that the federal law trumps the state's actions. Further, practically speaking,
the federal government has more power in the bargain, as it is the party of-
fering enough money to influence state policy (which New York v. United
States permits). States are not co-equal in the cooperative federalism con-
text, as states abandon some sovereignty when they agree to federal funding
with conditions. The Court has always deemed this trade-off to be permis-
sible.
Third, for all of its options, Medicaid has always had mandatory ele-
121. Medicaid Brief for Respondents, supra note 110, at 24.
122. Consolidated Brief for Respondents, supra note 110, at 16-17 (citing New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. at 158 (internal citation omitted)).
123. See Huberfeld, supra note 4, at 441-42 (relaying the early history of the Medicaid
program and failures due to lack of federal controls over monies disbursed to the states).
124. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §§ 4601-4607, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a, amended by 126 Stat.
156 (2012)) (expanding Medicaid to women and children after enrollment diminished when
welfare was decoupled from Medicaid); Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 301, Pub.
L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465 (tying the disabled on Supplemental Security Income to Medi-
caid).
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ments, unlike some of its predecessor programs. While earlier versions of
federal aid for welfare medicine contained few or no conditions, each
amendment of the Social Security Act that provided more money for the
states also provided more conditions for the states that accepted federal
funding.125 When Medicaid was enacted in 1965, it was clear that the pro-
gram had turned a corner in the mandatory conditions on spending, as the
Medicaid Act contained numerous mandatory elements.' 26 Despite those
mandatory elements, every state has been participating in Medicaid since
1972. Of course, although Medicaid has morphed through the years, the
states have continued to agree to new mandatory elements of the program.
Fourth, the states often say in one breath that they need more money for
their Medicaid populations but that they want fewer rules so that they can
have flexibility. This dichotomy is displayed in the Medicaid expansion.
In the years leading up to the passage of PPACA, a major recession swelled
the Medicaid rolls and led to state budget crises. The federal government
responded to states' cries for help with the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA), which provided "state fiscal relief' in the form of
additional federal matching money to help states maintain their Medicaid
programs.127 Much like the Medicaid expansion, 128 the ARRA contained a
maintenance-of-effort provision,129 which signaled to the states that the new
funding is not a free-for-all. When PPACA was negotiated, the ARRA was
a specter, as the states continued to suffer from the Great Recession but
ARRA funds were going to expire130
Thus, while the Medicaid expansion was a method for making all Ameri-
cans insurable and thus getting them through the healthcare gateway, it also
was a way to provide relief to the states. As initially envisioned, the Medi-
caid expansion population was going to be fully funded by the federal gov-
ernment; but, for cost control reasons, the federal match decreases slightly
over time (though it is still a supermatch of 90% once it phases down). 3 1
Many states lack deficit-spending capabilities due to balanced budget provi-
125. See Huberfeld, supra note 4, at 442-43.
126. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.
127. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Title V State Fiscal Relief,
Pub. L. No. 111-5 (Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter ARRA].
128. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001.
129. ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5001(f).
130. See Andrew Villegas, Sebelius To Governors: Extra Medicaid Money Comes With
A String Attached, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/
Stories/2010/August/19/Sebelius-Writes-Letter-To-Governors.aspx (explaining that the
ARRA Medicaid supplemental funding was due to expire at the end of 2010 but was extend-
ed until June 2011 at states' request).
131. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §
1201 (2010).
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sions in their constitutions. The federal government, on the other hand, can
engage in counter-cyclical spending and, in so doing, rescues the states.
The states would never relinquish control over their own funds in the way
that they ask the federal government to do; the federal government learned
long ago that it should not do so either, especially in the Medicaid con-
text. 132
The United States' assertion of broad spending power in the context of
the Medicaid expansion seems more consistent with existing precedent, the
philosophical nature of the Medicaid program, and with the statutory struc-
ture of Medicaid than the stance adopted in Douglas. The question be-
comes how to reconcile these conflicting messages.
III. TENSIONS, AND A TENTATIVE RESOLUTION
The United States has engaged in discordant advocacy in the two Medi-
caid cases before the Court. On the one hand, the United States was defer-
ential, even protective, toward the states in Douglas, characterizing the
states as equals in the Medicaid program. On the other hand, the United
States has interpreted congressional power under the Spending Clause quite
broadly in the briefs for Florida v. HHS. PPACA replaces the deserving
poor frame for Medicaid by eliminating the long-standing categorical re-
quirements for fitting within a category of sympathetic characteristics in
addition to poverty for eligibility. PPACA further reinvents Medicaid by
fully funding the newly eligible enrollees for the first several years they are
in the Medicaid population (though, this is not a major statutory change).1 33
These are two steps toward centralization, toward full federalization of
Medicaid, as well as philosophically new approaches to Medicaid eligibility
and financing.134 These changes also arguably move away from old notions
of who is responsible for welfare medicine.
In contrast, the draft regulations designed to actualize the Equal Access
provision, and upon which the Acting Solicitor General's brief relied, re-
veal the kind of path dependence that has kept Medicaid serving only the
deserving poor and maintaining solicitousness toward states' rights for for-
ty-seven years. The regulations do not sanction CMS authority to enforce
132. See generally Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, States' Strategies for
Tapping Federal Revenues: Implications and Consequences of Medicaid Maximization,
FEDERALISM AND HEALTH POLICY, URBAN INST. (John Holahan, Alan Weil, & Joshua M.
Wiener eds., 2003).
133. Even though the Medicaid expansion and supermatch are important moderniza-
tions of the Medicaid program, they are completely consistent with Medicaid's existing stat-
utory structure, as such improvements are exactly the kind that Congress has enacted time
and again since 1965. See Health Law Professors' Amicus Brief, supra note 111, at 4-13.
134. Huberfeld, supra note 4, at 450-5 1.
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the sufficiency requirement against the states. This renders the United
States' position that states know best how to set their own reimbursement
rates, backed up by CMS enforcement, confounding and disingenuous. If a
state sets extremely low reimbursement rates, CMS is unlikely to cut the
state off from its Medicaid funding because the remedy available under the
Medicaid Act would also be harmful to enrollees, who would suffer the
most from a sudden loss of federal funding. But the position the United
States has advocated would deny private enforcement and thus end the
more moderate remedy of simply ceasing the offending state behavior by
injunction. And so the states have a sort of shield from the very federal
power they are protesting in Florida v. HHS, as judicial enforcement would
be limited and executive enforcement is ineffective or nonexistent.
How can these tensions be resolved? One way would be for the Court to
decide the narrowest possible issue in each case, thereby allowing Congress
and HHS to work through their Medicaid inconsistencies. In Douglas, no
circuit split existed, so the earliest incarnations of this essay suggested that
the Court could decide the case narrowly by upholding the injunction grant-
ed by the Ninth Circuit without addressing the larger Supremacy Clause is-
sues raised by Medi-Cal or the United States. 35 The majority opinion, au-
thored by Justice Breyer, chose a path quite close to this prescription by
vacating and remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit in light of the Secre-
tary's approval of California's across-the-board cuts. 136 Perhaps HHS will
have adequate motivation and time to fix the draft regulations that have
been heavily criticized and begin to enforce the Equal Access provision in a
more substantive manner; however, it seems unlikely given the work that is
required to implement PPACA. Additionally, the draft regulations do not
facilitate CMS enforcement, as the agency would need much more in terms
of people, money, regulatory authority, and resources, would need to turn
some focus away from fraud prosecution, and would have to stop being
deferential to states' reimbursement decisions.
If CMS does not improve the draft regulations, the status quo is trou-
bling, because Gonzaga has made it so that states are virtually unaccounta-
ble for certain violations of the Medicaid Act, though not every Section
1983 cause of action was eliminated after Gonzaga.'37 Granted, vacating
135. This resolution would allow the Court to engage the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, which Chief Justice Roberts represented as important during his confirmation
hearings, and is an important aspect of separation of powers. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen,
Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 181
(quantifying and qualifying the Roberts Court's reliance on the avoidance doctrine).
136. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. _ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 1204
(No. 09-958) (2012).
137. Huberfeld, supra note 27, at 442-58 (explaining the inconsistent causes of action
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and remanding to the Ninth Circuit may expose states to more Equal Access
litigation; the Douglas plaintiffs have continued to advocate their position,
adding the Secretary to the named parties in the litigation and claiming that
HHS acted arbitrarily in approving California's reimbursement reduc-
tions. 138 The question of private rights of action has been left open and, un-
doubtedly, it will be tested another day.
Given that it was decided narrowly, Douglas seems to say little about
Florida v. HHS and the Medicaid expansion; but, this narrow holding just
defers hard questions rather than answer them. The Medicaid expansion
will introduce millions of citizens into Medicaid, and the single application
process will introduce the uninsured into the insurance exchanges with fed-
eral subsidies.139 States that complain about the cost of the expansion are
more likely to cut reimbursement for Medicaid providers, which in turn
could undermine the Medicaid expansion because the newly enrolled popu-
lation would not have sufficient physicians and other providers to serve
their medical needs. CMS already does not actively enforce the Equal Ac-
cess Provision, and it seems like the strain on financial and staffing re-
sources will be exacerbated by increased enrollment. Again, this analysis
assumes that the Equal Access draft regulations remain the same, i.e., they
do not empower CMS to police states more than information gathering and
amendment denial.
If the Court were to eliminate Supremacy Clause rights of action in an-
other case, or upon rehearing Douglas, perhaps CMS would be motivated to
focus on enforcing 30A. However, Congress, too, would have to act, not
just for Medicaid but also for all spending statutes with beneficiaries that
have traditionally turned to federal courts to enforce their rights. Blocking
private rights of action would protect states from being hailed into federal
courts but would also devolve responsibility to the states for their own in-
terpretation of federal law with little to no oversight and no remedy for vio-
lations of federal laws other than to withdraw all beneficial aspects of the
law. This is not what Justice Black meant by "Our Federalism."'
140
that have survived Gonzaga and those that have not).
138. See Cal. Med. Transp. Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV 11-9830 CAS, 2012 WL 760696,
at *5 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) (granting the CMTA's request for a preliminary injunction
against the rate reductions approved by CMS); Cal. Hosp. Ass'n v. Douglas, No. CV 11-
9078 CAS, 2012 WL 760646, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) (granting a similar preliminary
injunction); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Douglas, CV 11-9688 CAS, 2012 WL 273768, at *16 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction against Director Douglas and Secre-
tary Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human Services); Managed Pharmacy Care v.
Sebelius, No. CV 11-9211 CAS, 2011 WL 6820288, at *11 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 28, 2011) (grant-
ing a preliminary injunction against Secretary Sebelius).
139. PPACA, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1413.
140. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Justice Black is widely credited with
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A delayed but more broadly decided Douglas decision could also affect
private insurance aspects of PPACA. Those who enroll in private insurance
through the exchanges facilitated by PPACA are likely participating in fed-
eral spending, though they may not know it. In states that form their own
exchanges, the initial exchange formation will be funded with federal dol-
lars. 141 If a state does not administer the exchange properly, private parties
would likely try to hail the state into federal court to enforce the federal
rules for the exchanges against the state. In states that do not form their
own exchanges, this problem diminishes, as the federal government must
run the exchange according to PPACA. 142 Private parties would then be
seeking to enforce federal law against the federal government, which does
not implicate the federalism issues present in Douglas or Ex parte Young.
Any Douglas-type decision that considers the Supremacy Clause issue
will make it so that anyone who benefits from a federal conditional spend-
ing program that a state fails to deliver appropriately will be denied access
to the courthouse. 143 The justices recognized this potential sweep during
oral arguments, noting that all conditional spending, not just Medicaid, is at
issue in the United States' amicus brief.144 A number of the justices, in par-
ticular Justice Breyer, appeared to be seeking the narrowest possible hold-
ing in the case, which helps to explain the majority opinion that he wrote, as
discussed in Part I. 145 During oral arguments, certain justices posited that
the narrowest path would be to maintain the injunction so that CMS could
respond to the State Plan Amendment. 146 Vacating and remanding was a
coining this phrase to describe our divided style of government by writing:
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as
'Our Federalism,' and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Con-
stitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams
of 'Our Federalism.' The concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any
more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Gov-
ernment and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does rep-
resent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways
that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
141. Because of this, the False Claims Act has been expanded to apply to the exchang-
es. SeePPACA, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1313.
142. PPACA, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1321(c)(1).
143. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: October Term
2010, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 375 (2011) (summarizing the October 2010 term as notably being
inhospitable to plaintiffs, thereby "closing the courthouse doors").
144. See Oral Argument, supra note 91.
145. See id Justice Breyer was also skeptical about the Court narrowing Section 1983
doctrine in Gonzaga. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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slightly less narrow decision. It seems the Court wanted to allow CMS to
exercise primary jurisdiction and applied constitutional avoidance to allow
the lower courts to work through CMS's decision. The trouble is that lower
federal courts have now held CMS's approval to be arbitrary and capri-
cious, so this narrow holding may not stem the tide for long.
147
Similarly, the Court should decide the Medicaid expansion coercion
question narrowly by avoiding the constitutional question. This would
mean refusing to expand the coercion prong of the Dole test, or alternative-
ly, defining coercion but rejecting the application of coercion to the Medi-
caid expansion despite any enlarged understanding of states' rights. Certain
justices of the Roberts Court have signaled interest in revisiting Spending
Clause precedent to expand the judicially enforced Tenth Amendment to
that clause, 148 so it is possible the Court will extend the coercion theory to
render limits on the spending power judicially enforceable.
Granting the question regarding coercion indicates that the Court is seri-
ously considering reinforcing the coercion theory. Justice Kennedy was
given an opportunity to reiterate his federalism project in Bond v. United
States last term, 149 and he further stated belief that the power to spend
should be limited by the Tenth Amendment in Comstock v. United States
two terms ago. 50 If Justice Kennedy acts as the swing vote that many ob-
serve him to be, 15' then Florida was smart to tailor its coercion arguments to
his concerns. Given Kennedy's articulated interests, and the ongoing con-
servative goal of limiting the spending power by judicially enforced Tenth
Amendment principles, 52 it seems unlikely that the Court will eliminate the
coercion concept from Dole.
Questioning during oral arguments also indicated interest in expanding
147. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Douglas, CV 11-9688 CAS, 2012 WL 273768, at * 16
(granting a preliminary injunction against Director Douglas and Secretary Sebelius of the
Department of Health and Human Services because the agency's decision to permit deep
reimbursement cuts does not receive Chevron deference and appears arbitrary and capri-
cious).
148. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("The limits upon the spending power have not been much discussed, but if the relevant
standard is parallel to the Commerce Clause cases, then the limits and the analytic approach
in those precedents should be respected.").
149. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
150. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, On Court That Defied Labeling, Kennedy Made the
Boldest Mark, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2008), at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/06/29/washingtonr29scotus.htmlref-anthonymkennedy.
152. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Pro-
voke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003); see generally Lynn A. Baker, The Spending
Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195 (2001).
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the coercion theory into a doctrine that may be decided with an eye toward
reinforcing federalism ideals such as those recently articulated in Bond.
153
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy appeared to be exploring a polit-
ical "accountability" framework for coercion, which derives from Justice
O'Connor's observations New York v. United States.154 In New York, the
Court explained that the federal government may not "commandeer" the
states because voters supposedly will not know which elected officials to
penalize if they do not like the legislation enacted at the federal govern-
ment's command. Setting aside the viability of the theory of accountability,
which Justice Kennedy reiterated in his Lopez concurrence, 155 this account-
ability overlay would misread New York's explicit acceptance of federal
spending as a way to influence states and would be a bad fit for conditional
spending programs (which inherently require the federal government to of-
fer the states enough money that they will want to participate in, and often
enact laws to advance, a federal policy goal).1 56 Even if the federal gov-
ernment offers states very large sums of money, it does not mask the state's
choice to accept that money. And, if the federal government must cut fund-
ing, then the state has a reason to leave the program. Either way, state vot-
ers know that the federal government is driving the Medicaid program
changes.
A decision that expands coercion theory in Florida v. HHS could be far-
reaching, because so many major public programs rely upon conditional
spending laws. A decision that both expands coercion theory and strikes
down the Medicaid expansion as coercive could force a major overhaul of
Medicaid, which could be difficult in today's political climate, even given
the consistent poll results showing that Medicaid is a popular program.
157
Though I have advocated elsewhere for federalizing Medicaid, I am not
hopeful that a broad coercion decision in Florida v. HHS would lead to cen-
tralization. The more left-leaning justices appeared to understand the ex-
pansive implications of the plaintiffs' coercion arguments, and they asked
153. See Oral Arguments for Medicaid Expansion, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., No. 11-400 (March 28, 2012), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2011/2011_11 400.
154. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
155. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (expressing concern for polit-
ical accountability where the federal government regulates in the traditional areas of state
police power).
156. See Roderick M. Hills, The Political Accountability of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813,
824-30 (1998) (critiquing the accountability theory).
157. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL MAY 2011,
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8190-F.pdf (reporting that the majority of the public
polled support Medicaid as is and do not favor converting the program to block grants).
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hard questions of the states and expressed total skepticism of the coercion
revival attempt. However, it is impossible to know if their understanding
will carry the Court.
Ironically, an expanded coercion theory could backfire if the goal is to
intensify federalism (meaning state sovereignty) protections. An expanded
coercion doctrine would introduce the possibility of enforcing the Tenth
Amendment against the power to spend. In Bond, the Court recently articu-
lated that individuals can have standing to enforce the principles of the
Tenth Amendment against the federal government because federalism exists
to protect not just the states but also individuals. 158 Thus, an expanded co-
ercion theory could re-introduce Medicaid plaintiffs into the federal court
system, the very thing that the United States and the states are trying to
avoid in Douglas, thereby inhibiting the states' desired protection from fed-
eral court interference.
Finally, constitutional avoidance would serve a particularly important
purpose in Florida v. HHS. The United States has shown an inability to be
consistent in its advocacy this term that reflects a dissociation about Medi-
caid as a program, as an exercise of spending power, and as a matter of fed-
eralism. Congress and the executive branch should resolve this tension
without unnecessary pressure from the Court to avoid a nebulous concept of
coercion in the process. Separation of powers militates toward allowing the
elected branches to unravel the Medicaid problem, as many of the issues
laid before the Court have been illuminated as deeply political through the
briefing process. Neither case has been briefed in such a way as to allow
the Court to clarify the gaping holes in spending jurisprudence (such as
what "clear notice" means in a forty-seven year old program), nor do the
cases contain a clear vision of the Medicaid program from the perspective
of ensuring its stability and success through agency leadership. The Court
should allow Congress to address the enforcement deficiencies in the pro-
gram rather than dismantle it through coercion theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress has acted in ways that are contradictory regarding Medicaid
throughout the program's history, and those conflicting attitudes have been
accentuated by the executive branch's litigation strategies this Term. On
the one hand, Congress has expanded the Medicaid program through
PPACA in a historic manner, federalizing the definition of eligibility and
the funding for that new population. On the other hand, Medicaid has long
been regarded as a program that requires cost containment. 159 These ten-
158. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
159. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare and Medi-
Annals of Health Law
sions reflect how Medicaid has been treated over the years. Though the
Court cannot solve that problem, it could minimize confusion with narrow
holdings in both Douglas and Florida v. HHS. To do otherwise could insti-
gate changes for which both Congress and the executive branch appear to
be unprepared.
caid Program Policy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 759,
789 (1991) (observing that the states and federal government have approached Medicaid
from a cost-containment perspective since the 1970s).
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